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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

LONG BEACH UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT
v. DOROTHY B. GODWIN LNING TRUST, ET
AL., AND MOBIL OIL CORPORATION,
POWERINE OIL COMPANY: DETERMINING
THE SCOPE OF EASEMENT HOLDER
LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Long Beach Unified School Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin
California Living Trust,l the Ninth Circuit held that the holder of an easement burdening land which contains a hazardous
waste facility is not, by virtue of that interest alone, liable for
cleanup costs as an "owner or operator" under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
(hereinafter "CERCLA,,).2 The court reasoned that under common principles of property law, easement holders have a limited right to use the land of another but do not own the land
itself, and therefore, should not be considered owners for the
purposes of CERCLA liability.3

1. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32
F.3d 1364 (9th Cir. 1994) (per Kozinski, J., with whom Trott, J., and Williams, J.,
joined). This is a case of first impression for any federal circuit court.
2. Long Beach, 32 F.3d 1364. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. V
1993). This section is entitled the Comprehensive Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980.
3. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1364-70.
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The property at issue in this case was bought by the Long
Beach Unified School District (hereinafter "School District")
from the Dorothy B. Godwin Living Trust and the Grover
Godwin California Trust (hereinafter, collectively, "the Trusts")
in October, 1987.4 The land had previously been leased by the
Schafer Brothers Transfer and Piano Moving Company (hereinafter "Schafer Bros.")., which had built and operated a waste
pit on the land for ten years. 5 The waste pit was used by
Schafer Bros. for the illegal disposal of hazardous waste. 6
The land is subject to easements held by Mobil Oil Corporation and Powerine Company (hereinafter, collectively,
"M&P,,).7 The Mobil easement, which was granted prior to
1971,8 gave Mobil the rights to lay, operate, and maintain
pipelines through the parcel,9 and to request the owner of the
land to remove structures or improvements that interfered
with the use of the easement. 10 In April 1971, Mobil assigned
a portion of the easement to Powerine for a single line of
pipe. l l The owner of the land retained the right to build on
and otherwise use the land burdened by the easements, subject
to M&P's use of the easements. 12
A site assessment performed by the Trusts before the sale
was consummated revealed that the property was contaminated with petroleum and chlorinated hydrocarbons from the
waste pit left by Schafer Bros.13 The waste pit was located on

4. Appellees' Joint Brief at 2, Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B.
Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32 F.3d 1364 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 92-56562).
5. Id.
6. Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, Long Beach Unified 8ch. Dist. v. Dorothy
B. Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32 F.3d 1364 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 92-56562).
7. Long Beach Unified 8ch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32
F.3d 1364 (9th Cir. 1994).
8. Appellees' Joint Brief at 3, Long Beach (No. 92-56562). Mobil was granted
the easement by Angelo Gaspare and A.J. Land Company, an owner of the property prior to the Trusts. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 4.
11. Id. at 3.
12. Appellees' Joint Brief at 6, Long Beach (No. 92-56562).
13. Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, Long Beach (No. 92-56562).
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the portion of the property burdened by the easements. 14 The
Trusts estimated that it would cost a maximum of $249,000 to
remove the hazardous waste and decontaminate the property.15 Therefore, as a condition of sale, the Trusts put $250,000
in escrow for clean up costS. 16 However, the entire escrow
fund was exhausted by the investigation and expert evaluation
of the site, and no money was left for the actual cleanup.17
On September 5, 1991, the School District filed a complaint for recovery of the remaining response costs under
CERCLA against the Trusts, Schafer Bros., and M&P. 18 The
Trusts and Schafer Bros. settled with the School District and
agreed to pay a substantial share of the cleanup costS. 19 The
case continued against M&P. 20 The School District did not
allege that M&P polluted the property or even knew or had
reason to know of the waste pit. 21 Rather, the School District
claimed that M&P's status as easement holders qualified them
as "owners" or "operators" under 42 U.S.C. § 9607. 22 The district court granted M&P's 12(b)(6) motion23 to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 24
The School District appealed to the United States Court of
14. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1366.
15. Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, Long Beach (No. 92-56562).
16. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1366.
17. [d.

18. Appellant's Opening Brief at 4, Long Beach (No. 92-56562). The School
District also stated claims under California nuisance law in its complaint. The
School District did not appeal the district court's dismissal of the state law claims.
Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1366 n.l.
19. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1366. Under the settlement agreement the Trusts
assumed the bulk of the past remediation and costs and Schafer Bros. agreed to
assume the responsibility for future cleanup activities. Appellees' Joint Brief at 3,
Long Beach (No. 92-56562).
20. Long Beach, 32 F.3d 1366.
2l. [d.
22. [d. M&P's liability as "owners and operators" is discussed in section III.B.
See infra notes 39-66 and accompanying text.
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
24. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1366. M&P asserted in their motions that (1)
easement holders are not "owners" for the purposes of CERCLA and (2)
the CERCLA third party defense barred the claims against M&P because
the contamination was caused by a third party unconnected to Mobil or
Powerine. Appellees' Joint Brief at 2, Long Beach (No. 92-56562). The second
issue, involving the third party defense, was not addressed in the Ninth
Circuit opinion.
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 25
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit set the groundwork for its analysis by
evaluating the scope of CERCLA liability.26 CERCLA has
been read as a strict liability statute,27 has been applied retroactively,28 and has been used by plaintiffs to "pierce the corporate veil. "29 However, the court concluded that although
CERCLA liability is very broad, it is not unlimited. 30
A.

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CERCLA LIABILITY

The court determined that in order to recover under
CERCLA, the School District must show that (1) there was a
"release" or "threatened release,,31 of a hazardous substance

25. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1366.
26. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin Cal. Living
Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1366 (9th Cir. 1994).
27. [d. (citing General Electric Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys.,
Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1418 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that CERCLA is a strict
liability statute, with only a limited number of statutorily defined defenses available); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 n.ll (4th
Cir. 1988) (agreeing with "overwhelming body of precedent" interpreting
CERCLA as establishing a strict liability scheme); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d. Cir. 1985) (holding that CERCLA unequivocally imposes strict liability without regard to causation».
28. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1366. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 1986) ("Although
CERCLA does not expressly provide for retroactivity, it is manifestly
clear that Congress intended CERCLA to have a retroactive effect."); see
also United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (D.Colo. 1985)
(congressional intent was to hold responsible parties liable for pre-enactment response costs).
29. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1366. See United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030, 1036-38 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (corporation's former
president, chairman of board, and director held jointly and severally liable as "owner/operator" of corporation's facility at which hazardous substances had been released). But see Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893
F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990) (refusing to pierce the corporate veil to reach the
parent company).
30. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1366.
31. Under CERCLA, "[t)he term 'release' means any spilling, leaking,
pumping. pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment
or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles contain-

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss1/11

4

Poppe: Environmental Law

1995]

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

197

from the site; (2) the site is a "facility;"32 (3) the release
caused the School District to incur cleanup costs;33 and (4)
M&P fall within one of four classes of responsible parties under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).34 There was no dispute that the site

ing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant) ., .." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(22) (1988).
The language of section 107(a) requires only that there be a threat,
not an actual release. See Alfred R. Light, CERCLA Law and Procedure §
4.2.1 69 (Bureau of National Affairs 1991). Plaintiff must at least allege
such a threat in order to state a claim. Id. (citing New York v. Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985». Evidence of the presence
of hazardous substances at the facility when combined with the unwillingness of any party to assert control over the substance amounts to a
threat of release. United States v. Northemaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp.
742, 746-47 (W.D. Mich. 1987), affd sub nom. United States v. R.W. Meyer,
Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.1057 (1990).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) defines the term "facility" as:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment,
pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or
publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond,
lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or
(B) any site or area where a hazardous substance
has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or
otherwise came to be located.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
33. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1367. A person who pays for the cleanup of
a hazardous waste facility is entitled to recover from liable parties
"any . .. necessary costs of response . .. not inconsistent with the national contingency plan." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
The National Contingency Plan [hereinafter "NCP"I, 40 C.F.R. § 300
(1994) was originally prepared to implement section 311 of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d) (Supp. V 1993). Section 105
of CERCLA directed the revision of the NCP to establish more comprehensive procedures for responding to releases of hazardous substances pollutants and contaminants. 42 U.S.C. § 9605.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Section 9607(a) provides that:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility
at which such hazardous substances were disposed
of, (3) any person who by contract, agreement, or
otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment...
or arranged... for transport for disposal or
treatment of hazardous substances... (4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous waste
for transport to disposal or treatment .facilities . . .
from which there is a release or threatened release which
causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance shall be liable . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (emphasis added).
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was a "facility," that there was a release of a hazardous substance, or that this release caused M&P to incur cleanup
costS. 35 The School District did not allege that M&P were involved in generating, arranging, or transporting the hazardous
waste. 36 The sole issue was whether M&P, as easement holders, could be liable as "owners and operators" of a hazardous
waste facility.37
B.

LIABILITY

As "OWNER AND OPERATOR"

The Ninth Circuit followed the reasoning of other courts
and read the terms "owner and operator" in the disjunctive. 38
A party may be liable as either an "owner" or an "operator," or
both. 39 The School District argued that as easement holders,
M&P were liable as both owners and operators of the facility.40 The School District reasoned that the term "owner" as
used in CERCLA is not limited to persons who hold title in fee
simple, but rather refers to any person holding "indicia of ownership.,,41

The italicized phrase appears in only one of the four paragraphs
identifying potentially liable persons in the statute, but courts consider
the unusual sectioning of the provision a "printer's error" and apply the
liability threshold to all four categories. See, e.g., Bryant v. Colonial
Pipeline Co., 699 F. Supp. 546, 548 (W.O. Va. 1987) (holding that the liability
threshold is applicable to all four categories).
35. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Goodwin Cal. Living
Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1366-67.
36. Id. at 1367.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554
n.3 (11th Cir. 1990); Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc.,
849 F.2d 1568, 1573 (5th Cir. 1988); Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg.
Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 561 (W.O. Pa. 1989); Artesian Water Co. v. Government
of New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1280-81 (D.De\. 1987), affd, 851
F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F.
Supp. 573, 578 <D.Md. 1986».
39. Id.
40. Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, Long Beach (No. 92-56562). The School
District did not distinguish between liability as an owner and as an operator in its brief. Id. at 6-18.
41. Id. at 6.
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1. Although An Easement Holder Can Be Liable As An "Operator" Under CERCLA, M&P Do Not Qualify As Operators
The Ninth Circuit found that while an easement holder
can sometimes be the "operator" of a hazardous waste facility,
M&P did not fit within this definition.42 The court stated that
to be an "operator" of a hazardous waste facility a party must
play an active role in running the facility, usually involving
day to day participation in the facility's management. 43 Since
pipelines are expressly included in the definition "facility,"44
an easement holder would be liable for owning a pipeline from
which a hazardous substance was leaking, if all of the other
elements were met. 45 The School District, however, did not
allege that M&P's pipelines leaked.46 The School District
merely alleged that since M&Ps pipelines crossed the property, M&P were in a position to prevent the contamination.47
The court noted that an easement holder would be hard presses to stop any pollution she might discover since she would
have no control over the property beyond preventing interference with the easement. 46 Therefore, the court concluded that

42. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1367.
43. [d. See, e.g., Edward Hines Lumber v. Vulcan Material Co., 861 F.2d
155, 157-58 (7th Cir. 1988) (Supplier is not operator because he cannot control work at plant, choose employees, direct their activities or set prices.
A limited veto, in and of itself is not enough to make him an operator);
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985) (defendant "is in charge of the operation of the facility in question, and as
such is an operator within the meaning of CERCLA"). Cf, In re Bergsoe
Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 1990) (secured creditor not liable
under section 9601(20)(A) unless he engages in "some actual management");
40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (EPA rule indicating that secured lenders are only
liable if they actually participate in facility's management).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988). See supra note 33 for text of 42 U.S.C. §
9601(9).
45. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1367. In this situation the easement holder
might also be liable as an arranger or transporter under sections
9607(a)(3) and (a)(4). See supra note 35 for text of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). The
court did not reach the closer question of an easement holder's potential
liability as an operator when he leases his right to lease the land to
someone else, who then operates a leaking pipe. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1367
n.3.
46. [d. at 1367.
47. [d. The School District alleged that M&P had the ability to monitor and control the facility and to notify the authorities of the disposal.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 8, Long Beach (No. 92-56562).
48. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1369 n.6.
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M&P could not be liable as operators under CERCLA because
M&P did not have any control over the facility or the ability to
prevent the release. 49

2. Holding An Easement Is An Insufficient Basis For Liability
As An "Owner" Under CERCLA
The School District argued that as easement holders M&P
were liable as "owners" of the facility.50 The statutory definition of "owner or operator" merely repeats the operative
terms,51 defining "owner and operator" as "any person owning
or operating" a facility.52 The court found that the circularity
of this definition "strongly implies ... that the statutory terms
have their ordinary meanings rather than unusual or technical
meanings. "53 Therefore, the court read the statute as incorporating the ordinary common law definitions of its terms. 54
The court found that under the common law, an easement
holder is not viewed as the owner of the .land burdened by the
easement. 55 Although an easement is an interest in land, it is
49. [d. at 1368.

50. [d.
51. Appellees Joint Brief at 5, Long Beach (No. 92-56562).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(a).
53. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1368 (citing Edward Hines Lumber Co., 861 F.2d
at 156) (Congress intended courts to turn to common law analogies to
. define CERCLA's terms). See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 114 S. Ct.
1960, 1966-68 (1994) (construing statutory term "enforcement activities" according to its plain meaning); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.s. 1, 911
(1989)
(relying
on
a
"cascade
of plain
language");
Cadillac
Fairview/California v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to imply private right of injunctive relief based on plain language
of CERCLA).
54. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1368. An "owner" is the "person in whom is
vested the ownership, dominion, or title of property; proprietor." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 764 (6th ed. 1990). "Ownership" is the "collection of rights
to use and enjoy property, including right to transmit it to others. The
complete dominion, title or proprietary right in a thing or claim. The entirety of the powers of use and disposal allowed by law." [d. at 765.
55. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1368. For other cases supporting this holding,
see Robinson v. Cuneo, 290 P.2d 656, 658 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955) (refusing
to construe easement to prohibit owner of land from using area of easement because, unlike owner, easement holder "owns no part of the land
itself and has no right to exclude the owner from the use of any of the
land, except insofar as a use interferes with his easement rights"); Henry
Bickel Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 336 S.W.2d 345, 347-48 (Ky. 1960)
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only "a limited use or enjoyment of the land in which the interest exists,... it is not itself either land or an estate in
land."56 The court found the distinction between ownership of
an easement and ownership of the burdened land to be well
established. 57 Therefore, the court found no common law basis
for finding that easement holders are owners for purposes of
CERCLA liability. 58
The court also found that public policy supported this
reading of the statute. 59 Numerous types of easements encumber land titles throughout the United States. GO Easements
establish a variety of rights ranging from the running of utility
poles to overflight, use of a swimming pool and scenic easements. 61 The court held that to subject all easement holders
to CERCLA liability would be contrary to the policy behind the
statute, which strives to impose the costs of cleanup on those
responsible for the contamination. 62 The court further noted
that finding easement holders to be owners for the purposes of
CERCLA liability would unjustifiably expand the number of
potential CERCLA defendants to include "many non-polluting
actors with no greater responsibility for the nation's toxic
waste problem than the general public.,,63 The court also con-

(easement holder is not an "owner" of land); Weeks v. Texas lllinois Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 276 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Tex. 1955) (easement holder did
not have possessory interest or any right in property beyond the limits of
right to lay and maintain pipeline and therefore could not be held liable
for waste).
56. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1368 (quoting City of Hayward v. Mohr, 325
P.2d 209, 214 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958».
57. [d.
58. [d. at 1368-69. Although the court deemed a defendant's status as
an "owner" under the common law as necessary to being an "owner" under
CERCLA, they did not consider whether it is sufficient. [d. at 1369 n.5.
59. [d. at 1369.
60. [d.
61. [d. (citing OLIN BROWDER ET AL., BASIC PROPERTY LAw 514-95 (5th ed.
1989)).
62. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1369 (citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491
U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). See also United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F.
Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.Minn. 1982) ("Congress intended that those responsible
for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs
and responsibility for remedying the harmful condition they created.").
63. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1369. Among these non-polluting actors are
utilities with easements to run pipelines and cables. The court found that
a non-polluting utility should not be liable simply because it has deep
pockets. [d.
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eluded that to expand liability to include easement holders
would serve no purpose beyond providing a deep pocket from
which to recover response costs. 64 Therefore, in the absence of
a clearer expression from the legislature imposing liability on
easement holders, the court refused to construe the term "owner" to include easement holders. 65

3. The Lender Liability Provision Of CERCLA Does Not
Expand The Definition Of Owner To Encompass Easement
Holders
The School District also asked the court to interpret the
term "owner" to include any person holding "indicia of ownership.,,66 Section 9601(20)(a) of CERCLA excludes from the
definition of owner "a person who without participating in the
management of a vessel or facility holds indicia of ownership
to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.n67 The
School District reasoned that anyone who holds "indicia of
ownership" for any reason other than to protect a security
interest is therefore an "owner.,,68 They further argued that
M&P's easement constituted "indicia of ownership" held for
reasons other than protection of a security interest and that
therefore M&P should be liable under CERCLA. 69
The court reasoned that this clause was included in
CERCLA to resolve only the narrow issue of non-managing
64. Id. at 1369 n.6. One commentator has advocated ownership liability
for easement holders, suggesting that they could provide useful monitoring of hazardous waste disposal. See Jill D. Neiman, Note, Easement Holder
Liability Under CERCLA: The Right Way to Deal with Rights·of·Way, 89 MICH. L.
REv. 1233 (1991). But see Melissa A. McGonigal, Comment, Extended Liability
Under CERCLA: Easement Holders and the Scope of Control, 87 Nw. U. L. REV.
992, 1022 (1993) ("easement holders would not make efficient or competent
monitors").
65. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1369.
66.Id.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(a).
68. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1369.
69. Id. In its brief, the School District ignored the regulatory defini·
tion of the term "indicia of ownership." The definition includes a long list
of security interests such as mortgages and deeds of trust, but does not
include interests such as easements, which have nothing to do with fi·
nancing real estate transactions. Appellees' Joint Brief at 12, Long Beach
(No.92·56562) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 3001.1100(a».
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lenders' liability.70 The court also noted that the Environmental Protection Agency, in issuing a rule construing the clause,
did not draw the broad negative inference urged by the School
District. 71 The court therefore refused to find that this clause
was intended by Congress to impose liability on easement
holders and anyone else holding an interest in land containing
a toxic waste facility, without an examination of the nature
and extent of the interest.72
IV. CONCLUSION
In order to be liable as an "owner" of a hazardous waste
facility under CERCLA, the defendant must be an owner under
the common law. Under the common law an easement holder
is not viewed as the owner of the land burdened by the easement. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit found that M&P could not
be liable based on their status as easement holders alone. 73
Although an easement holder can be held liable as an
"operator" of a hazardous waste facility, M&P did not qualify
because they did not have any active control over nor participate in the management of the facility. Easement holder liability in the absence of common law ownership therefore hinges
on the degree of participation in the facility's management.
As non-participating holders of easements burdening land

containing a hazardous waste facility, M&P cannot be held

70. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1369. This narrow issue has prompted disagreement among the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal. Compare
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 668 (11th Cir. 1990) ("actual
management unnecessary for secured creditor liability") with In re Bergsoe
Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990) (some actual management is necessary for a secured creditor to be liable).
71. 1d. at 1369-70. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (Environmental Protection
Agency rule indicating that secured creditors are liable only if they engage in actual participation in the facility's management).
72. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1369-70.
73. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin Cal. Living
Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1369 (9th Cir. 1994). This holding was followed in
Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co. v. Acme Belt Recoating, Inc., 859 F.
Supp. 1125 (W.O. Mich. 1994) (owner or operator of a loading dock on land
not belonging to it, but over which it holds an easement for ingress and
egress, cannot be found liable on that basis alone).
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liable for cleanup costs as either "owners" or "operators" under
CERCLA.

Heidi P. Poppe *

* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1995.
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